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The hitchhiker’s guide to decidability and complexity of
equivalence properties in security protocols?
Vincent Cheval, Steve Kremer, and Itsaka Rakotonirina
Inria Nancy Grand-Est & LORIA
Abstract. Privacy-preserving security properties in cryptographic protocols are
typically modelled by observational equivalences in process calculi such as the
applied pi-calulus. We survey decidability and complexity results for the auto-
mated verification of such equivalences, casting existing results in a common
framework which allows for a precise comparison. This unified view, beyond
providing a clearer insight on the current state of the art, allowed us to identify
some variations in the statements of the decision problems—sometimes result-
ing in different complexity results. Additionally, we prove a couple of novel or
strengthened results.
Keywords: Formal verification · Cryptographic protocols · Complexity.
1 Introduction
Symbolic verification techniques for security protocols can be traced back to the sem-
inal work of Dolev and Yao [38]. Today, after more than 30 years of active research
in this field, efficient and mature tools exist, e.g. PROVERIF [15] and TAMARIN [50]
to only name the most prominent ones. These tools are able to automatically verify
full fledged models of widely deployed protocols and standards, such as TLS [14,34],
Signal [47,29], the upcoming 5G standard [11], or deployed multi-factor authentication
protocols [45]. We argue that the development of such efficient tools has been possi-
ble due to a large amount of more theoretical work that focuses on understanding the
precise limits of decidability and the computational complexity of particular protocol
classes [39,41,49,40,30,46].
The abovementioned results extensively cover verification for the class of reacha-
bility properties. Such properties are indeed sufficient to verify authentication properties
and various flavors of confidentiality, even in complex scenarios with different kinds of
compromise [10]. Another class of properties are indistinguishability properties. These
properties express that an adversary cannot distinguish two situations and are conve-
niently modelled as observational equivalences in a cryptographic process calculus,
such as the applied pi calculus. Such equivalences can indeed be used to model strong
flavors of secrecy, in terms of non-interference or as a “real-or-random” experiment.
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research and innovation program (grant agreements No 645865-SPOOC), as well as from the
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Equivalences are also the tool of choice to model many other privacy-preserving prop-
erties. Such properties include anonymity [3], unlinkability properties [6,42], as well as
vote privacy [37] to give a few examples. Equivalence properties are inherently more
complex than reachability properties, and both the theoretical understanding and tool
support are more recent and more brittle. This state of affairs triggered a large amount
of recent works to increase our theoretical understanding and improve tool support.
In this paper we give an extensive overview of decidability and complexity results
for several process equivalences. In particular, in this survey we give a unified view,
allowing us to highlight subtle differences in the definitions of the decision problems
across the literature (such as whether the term theory is part of the input or not) as well
as the protocol models. Typically, models may vary in whether they allow for a bounded
or unbounded number of sessions, the support of cryptographic primitives, whether they
support else branches (i.e. disequality tests, rather than only equality tests), and various
restrictions on non-determinism. Additionally, our technical report [25] contains full
proofs of all results that are novel or that required additional arguments to make up
for the differences in stating the problem compared to the original work. All the re-
sults are summarised in Table 1, and we identify several open questions. Delaune and
Hirschi [36] also survey symbolic methods for verifying equivalence properties. How-
ever, they mainly discuss tool support whereas we focus on computational complexity.
2 Model
We will model protocols as processes in the applied pi calculus, and cryptographic prim-
itives are modelled using terms equipped with rewrite rules. We assume the reader is
familiar with these notions and only recall them briefly and informally. A fully-detailed
model can be found in the technical report [25].
Cryptographic primitives. As usual in symbolic protocol analysis we take an abstract
view of cryptography and model the messages exchanged during the protocol as terms
built over a set of function symbols each with a given arity. Terms are then either
atomic values or function symbols applied to other terms, respecting the function’s
arity. Atomic values are either constants, i.e., function symbols of arity 0 or names.
Constants, sometimes referred to as public names, model public values, such as agent
identities or protocol tags. Names model secret values, such as keys or nonces, and are
a priori unknown to the adversary. We assume an infinite set of constants and names.
Example 1. For example the encryption of a plaintextmwith a key k using a symmetric
encryption scheme senc is modelled by the term senc(m, k). 4
The functional properties of the symbols are modelled by an equational theory. In this
work we restrict ourselves to equational theories that can be oriented into a convergent
rewriting system. This also implies that any term t has a unique normal from t↓.
Example 2. The rewrite rule sdec(senc(x, y), y) → x defines the behaviour of the en-
cryption scheme: one can decrypt (apply sdec) a ciphertext senc(x, y) with the corre-
sponding key y to recover the plaintext x. This behaviour is idealised by the absence
of other rules for senc and sdec, modelling an assumption that no information can be
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extracted from a ciphertext except by possessing the decryption key. Similarly, asym-
metric encryption can be modelled by the rewrite rule adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) → x
where pk is a symbol of arity 1 modelling public keys. Such rewrite rules can express a
broad range of other primitives like pairs (fst(〈x, y〉) → x and snd(〈x, y〉) → y), hash
functions (no rewrite rule) or randomised encryption (adding an additional argument to
senc to explicitly represent the randomness). 4
In this survey we call a theory the set of non-constant function symbols together with a
rewriting system. Two classes of theories are particularly important for our results. The
first is the class of subterm convergent theories [2,12,16,22,28,31], defined by a syntac-
tic criterion on rewriting rules ` → r requiring that r is either a strict subterm of ` or a
ground term in normal form. The second is the class of constructor-destructor theories
[16,20,22], partitioning function symbols into constructor (used to build terms) and de-
structors (only used in rewrite rules). In constructor-destructor theories any rewrite rule
` → r is such that ` = d(t1, . . . , tn) where d is a destructor and t1, . . . , tn, r do not
contain any destructor. Moreover, we assume a message predicate msg(t) which holds
if u↓ does not contain any destructor symbol for all subterms u of t, i.e., all destructor
applications in t succeeded yielding a valid message. This predicate is used to restrict
to protocols that only send and accept such well-formed messages.
Protocols. Protocols are defined using processes in the applied pi calculus. The syntax
of protocols is defined by the grammar of processes:
P,Q ::= 0 if u = v then P else Q c(x).P c〈u〉.P P | Q
Intuitively the 0 models a terminated process, a conditional if u = v then P else Q
executes either P or Q depending on whether the terms u↓ and v↓ are equal, and P | Q
models two processes executed concurrently. The constructs c(x).P and c〈u〉.P model,
respectively, inputs and outputs on a communication channel c. When the channel c is
known to the attacker, e.g. when it is a constant, executing an output on c adds it to the
adversary’s knowledge and inputs on c are fetched from the adversary possibly forward-
ing a previously stored message, or computing a new message from previous outputs.
Otherwise the communication is performed silently without adversarial interferences.
To model an unbounded number of protocol sessions we also add the two constructs
P,Q ::= new k.P !P
The replication !P models an unbounded number of parallel copies of P , and new k.P
creates a fresh name k unknown to the attacker; in particular !new k.P models an
unbounded number of sessions, each with a different fresh key. The fragment of the
calculus without replication is referred to as finite or bounded. Another notable subclass
is the original pi-calculus [48], referred to as the pure fragment, that can be retrieved
with the empty theory (only names, constants and an empty rewrite system).
Semantics in an adversarial environment. The behaviour of processes is formalised by
an operational semantics. The detailed presentation differs from one work to another
[1,21,22] and we only give a high-level overview here. It takes the form of a transi-
tion relation (P,Φ) α−→ (P ′, Φ′) on configurations (P,Φ) where P is the process to be
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executed, and Φ is called a frame and records the attacker knowledge. A frame is a sub-
stitution of the form {ax1 7→ t1, . . . , axn 7→ tn} where ti are previous outputs and axi
are special variables called axioms that serve as handles to the adversary for building
new terms. The label α of the transition step is called an action and is either
an unobservable action τ which represents an internal action, such as the evaluation
of a conditional or a communication on a private channel;
an input action ξc(ξt) where ξc (resp. ξt) represents the attacker’s computation of the
input’s public channel (resp. of the term to be input), see recipes in the next section;
an output action ξc〈axi〉 where ξc is again the attacker’s computation of the channel,
and the underlying output term is added to the frame as axiom axi.
We refer to the technical report [25] for full details of the semantics but provide addi-
tional intuition through the following example. Suppose that an agent S wants to send
a nonce N to a recipient R. Assuming S and R already share a secret ks , S encrypts N
and ks with the public key of R, i.e. pk(kR) where kR is the corresponding private key.
When receiving a message,R acknowledges the nonce only if the plaintext contains the
shared secret. This is modelled by the following process:
P = S | R with S = c〈M〉 where M = aenc(〈N, ks〉, pk(kR))
and R = c(x). if snd(adec(x, kR)) = ks then c〈ack〉 else 0
with ks , kR, N ∈ N and c ∈ Σ0. The 0 processes are omitted. The fact that the public
key should be known to the attacker is modelled by a frame Φ0 = {ax0 7→ pk(kR)}. A
“normal” execution of the protocol would be, with informal notations:
(S | R,Φ0)
c〈ax1〉−−−−→ (0 | R,Φ1) with Φ1 = Φ0 ∪ {ax1 7→M} (1)
c(ax1)−−−−→ (0 | if snd(adec(M,kR)) = ks then c〈ack〉 else 0, Φ1) (2)
τ−→ (0 | c〈ack〉, Φ1) (3)
c〈ax2〉−−−−→ (0 | 0, Φ1 ∪ {ax2 7→ ack}) (4)
Here the attacker is passive and only forwards messages. More precisely in transition
(1), S sends M which is added to the frame as reference ax1. This models that the
attacker spies on the communication network and gets access to all messages sent on
public channels like c. In transition (2) the attacker forwards M to R, i.e. inputs ax1.
Transition (3) is an internal test of R which leads to the final acknowledgement output
(4). An active attacker would also have the capability of forging new messages and
inserting them in the execution flow. For example transition (2) can be replaced by the
input
c(aenc(〈a,b〉,ax0))−−−−−−−−−−−→ with a, b ∈ Σ0: rather than forwarding M the attacker encrypts
the pair of constants a, b with the public key of R (using reference ax0) and sends it
to R. In this modified execution the subsequent test would however fail. Finally let us
mention that for constructor-destructor theories, all attacker-crafted terms must be valid
messages, i.e. satisfy the predicate msg [22,27].
When defining security against an active attacker we quantify over all such transi-
tions which means we consider all possible executions in an active adversarial environ-
ment. Thus even the bounded fragment yields an infinite transition system if the theory
contains a non-constant function symbol (as this allows to build an unbounded number
of messages).
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3 Complexity of static equivalence (passive attacker)
3.1 Static equivalence
Attacker knowledge. As explained above, frames Φ = {ax1 7→ t1, . . . , axn 7→ tn}
record the outputs ti performed during the execution of a process. They therefore enable
adversarial deductions as they aggregate: for example after observing a ciphertext and
the decryption key, the attacker can also obtain the plaintext by decrypting. Formally
we say that one can deduce all terms of the form ξΦ↓ where ξ is called a recipe that
is a term built from function symbols, axioms axi ∈ dom(Φ), and constants. Recipes
were mentioned in the previous section, in the operational semantics, as the way to
specify attacker’s computations. The fact that recipes cannot contain names models that
names are assumed unknown to the adversary initially. For example in Φ = {ax1 7→
senc(t, k), ax2 7→ k} the term t is deducible by the recipe sdec(ax1, ax2), regardless of
k being a name (which is not allowed to occur directly in the recipe).
Indistinguishability. Some security properties against a passive attacker, i.e. a simple
eavesdropper, can then be modelled as an observational equivalence of two frames:
intuitively no equality test can be used to distinguish them. For example, in a protocol
that outputs a sequence of messages t1, . . . , tn, the “real-or-random” confidentiality of
a key k can be modelled as the equivalence of
Φ = {ax1 7→ t1, . . . , axn 7→ tn, ax 7→ k} Ψ = {ax1 7→ t1, . . . , axn 7→ tn, ax 7→ k′}
where k′ is a fresh key. More formally, two frames Φ, Ψ with same domain are statically
equivalent when for all recipes ξ1, ξ2 we have that
ξ1Φ↓= ξ2Φ↓ ⇐⇒ ξ1Ψ↓= ξ2Ψ↓ .
In constructor-destructor theories we also require that msg(ξ1Φ) iff msg(ξ1Ψ), mod-
elling an assumption that the adversary can observe destructor failures.
Example 3. If k, k′ are names, Φ = {ax 7→ k} and Ψ = {ax 7→ k′} are equivalent,
capturing the intuition that random keys cannot be distinguished. However, for the con-
stant 0, Φ = {ax1 7→ senc(0, k), ax2 7→ k} and Ψ = {ax1 7→ senc(0, k), ax2 7→ k′} are
not equivalent since ξ1 = sdec(ax1, ax2) and ξ2 = 0 are equal in Φ but not in Ψ . 4
3.2 Complexity results
We study the following decision problem referred to as STATEQ:
INPUT: A theory, two frames of same domain.
QUESTION: Are the two frames statically equivalent for this theory?
General case. As rewriting is Turing-complete, unsurprisingly static equivalence is
undecidable in general for convergent rewriting systems [2]. It is also proved in [2]
that the DEDUCIBILITY problem (given a term t and a frame Φ, is t deducible in Φ?)
reduces to STATEQ. As a consequence, the results of [5] imply that static equivalence is
also undecidable for so-called optimally-reducing rewrite systems, a subclass of rewrite
systems that have the finite-variant property [17].
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Subterm convergent theories. Historically, complexity results for static equivalence
only considered fixed theories [2,12], that is, the theory was not part of the input of
the problem and its size was seen as a constant in the complexity analysis. This was
consistent with most formalisms and verification tools at the time, which would not al-
low for user-defined theories and only consider a fixed set of cryptographic primitives,
such as in the spi-calculus for example [4]. In particular fixed theories are considered
in the following result:
Theorem 1 ([2]). For all fixed subterm convergent theories STATEQ is PTIME.
Generic PTIME-completeness results would make no sense when the theory is not
part of the input, since the complexity may depend of it. Typically when using an empty
theory the complexity changes:
Theorem 2 ([22]). In the pure pi-calculus, STATEQ is LOGSPACE.
However, in some sense, the PTIME bound is optimal since it is possible to provide
a hardness result for a large class of fixed subterm convergent theories:
Theorem 3. For all fixed theories containing symmetric encryption, STATEQ is PTIME-
hard.
Proof (Sketch). We proceed by reduction from HORNSAT. Let X the set of variables
of a Horn formula ϕ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn, and kx names for all x ∈ X ∪ {⊥}. Then to
each clause C = x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x, x ∈ X ∪ {⊥} we associate the term
tC = senc(. . . senc(senc(kx, kx1), kx2), . . . , kxn) .
Putting kx under several layers of encryption ensures that kx is deducible if all the
keys kx1 , . . . , kxn are deducible as well. In particular k⊥ is deducible from the terms
tC1 , . . . , tCn iff the formula ϕ is unsatisfiable. Hence given two constants 0,1, and
Φ = {ax1 7→ tC1 , . . . , axn 7→ tCn}, we have that the frames Φ∪{ax 7→ senc(0, k⊥)}
and Φ ∪ {ax 7→ senc(1, k⊥)} are statically equivalent iff ϕ is satisfiable. ut
However tools have improved since then and automated provers like KISS [28],
YAPA [13] or FAST [31] are able to handle user-defined theories. It is therefore interest-
ing today to refer to complexity analyses that account for the size of the rewrite system:
Theorem 4 ([22]). STATEQ is coNP-complete for subterm convergent theories.
Beyond subterm convergence. Although we are not aware of complexity results for the
decision of static equivalence for classes larger than subterm theories, there exist de-
cidability results. Some of the abovementioned tools, like KISS and YAPA, can actually
handle most convergent rewriting system; but they naturally fail to terminate in gen-
eral by undecidability of the problem. However it is proved in [28] that the termination
of KISS is guaranteed for theories modelling blind signatures or trapdoor commitment
(that are typically not subterm).
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4 Complexity of dynamic equivalences (active attacker)
4.1 Equivalences
We expect security protocols to provide privacy against attackers that actively engage
with the protocol. This can be modelled by behavioural equivalences, defining security
as the indistinguishability of two instances of the protocol that differ on a privacy-
sensitive attribute. There exist several candidate equivalences for modelling this notion
of indistinguishability. We study two of them here and refer to [21] for details.
Trace equivalence. The first one is trace equivalence. Referring to the operational se-
mantics described in Section 2, we call a trace t a sequence of transition steps
t = (A0
α1−→ A1
α2−→ · · · αn−−→ An)
If tr is the word obtained after removing unobservable actions (i.e. τ ’s) from the word
α1 · · ·αn, the trace t may be written A0
tr
=⇒ An instead. Processes P0 and P1 are then
trace equivalent when for all traces Pi
tr
=⇒ (P,Φ), i ∈ {0, 1}, there exists P1−i
tr
=⇒
(P ′, Φ′) such that the frames Φ and Φ′ are statically equivalent. Automated verification
of trace equivalence has been studied intensively for security protocols [7,20,21,22] and
received strong tool support [17,18,23,32,33]. We refer to this problem as TRACEEQ:
INPUT: A theory, two processes.
QUESTION: Are the two processes trace equivalent?
Labelled bisimilarity. Some other tools prove stronger equivalences, like observational
equivalence for PROVERIF [16,19] for example. There exist several flavours of more
operational bisimulation-based properties but the one usually considered in security-
protocol analysis is labelled bisimilarity because it coincides with observational equiv-
alence in the applied pi-calculus [1]. Formally it is an early, weak bisimulation that
additionally requires static equivalence at each step; that is, it is the largest symmetric
binary relation ≈ on processes such that A ≈ B implies that (1) the frames of A and
B are statically equivalent, and (2) for all actions α and all transitions A α−→ A′, there
exists a trace B α=⇒ B′ such that A′ ≈ B′. We refer to the following problem as BISIM:
INPUT: A theory, two processes.
QUESTION: Are the two processes labelled bisimilar?
4.2 Classical fragments of the calculus
In addition to the assumptions on the rewriting system (e.g. subterm convergence as in
Section 3), there are several common restrictions made on the processes.
Conditionals and patterns. A typical restriction on conditionals is the class of positive
processes that only contains trivial else branches [12,21,22]. In particular for succint-
ness we often write [u = v]P instead of if u = v then P else 0.
When the rewrite system is constructor-destructor, some conditionals may also be
encoded within inputs [26,27]. For that the syntax for inputs is generalised as c(v).P
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where v is a term without destructors (but may contain variables), called a pattern. In
terms of semantics, such inputs only accept terms that match the pattern, i.e. inputs
t such that t ↓= uσ ↓ for some substitution σ, and then proceeds to execute Pσ. In
this paper, to ensure that protocols can be effectively implemented we require that it
is possible to test with a sequence of positive conditionals that a term t matches the
pattern u, and that all variables of u can be extracted by applying destructors to u. We
thus define the patterned fragment to be the class of processes without conditionals but
using pattern inputs, and where outputs do not contain destructor symbols; it is a subset
of the positive fragment.
Ping pong protocols. These protocols [27,38,44] intuitively consist of an unbounded
number of parallel processes receiving one message and sending a reply. Although the
precise formalisms may differ from one work to another, the mechanisms at stake are
essentially captured by processes P = !P1 | · · · |!Pn where




1] · · · [uini = v
i
ni ]new k1 · · · new kri . ci〈wi〉
In particular ping-pong protocols are positive.
Simple processes. A common middleground in terms of expressivity and decidability
is the class of simple processes, for example studied in [21,26]. Intuitively, they consist
of a sequence of parallel processes that operate each on a distinct, public channel—
including replicated processes that generate dynamically a fresh channel for each copy.
Formally they are of the form
P1 | · · · | Pm | !ch Pm+1 | · · · | !ch Pn where !ch P = ! new cP . c′P 〈cP 〉. P
where each Pi does not contain any parallel operator (|) nor replication (!) and uses
a unique, distinct communication channel cPi . Unlike ping pong protocols, each par-
allel process may input several messages and output messages that depend on several
previous inputs. There exists a generalisation of simple processes called determinate
processes, mentioned later in Section 5.
4.3 Complexity results: bounded fragment
The bounded fragment is a common restriction to study decidability, as removing repli-
cation bounds the length of traces. However, as the attacker still has an unbounded
number of possibilities for generating inputs, the transition system still has infinite
branching in general. Additional restrictions are also necessary on the cryptographic
primitives (as static equivalence is undecidable in general). For subterm convergent,
constructor-destructor theories for example:
Theorem 5 ([22]). TRACEEQ and BISIM are decidable in coNEXP for subterm conver-
gent constructor-destructor theories and bounded processes.
We do not detail the decision procedures as they are quite involved. In a nutshell,
they use a dedicated constraint-solving procedure to show that, whenever trace equiva-
lence is violated, there exists an attack trace whose attacker-input terms are at most of
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exponential size; in particular this shows non-equivalence to be decidable in NEXP. As
before, we may also study the problem for fixed theories to investigate their influence
on the complexity; typically with the empty theory:
Theorem 6 ([22]). In the pure pi-calculus, TRACEEQ (resp. BISIM) is Π2-complete
(resp. PSPACE-complete) for bounded processes, and for bounded positive processes.
However, unlike static equivalence, fixing the theory does not make it possible to
obtain a bound that is better than the general one:
Theorem 7 ([22]). There is a subterm-convergent constructor-destructor theory s.t.
TRACEEQ and BISIM are coNEXP-hard for bounded positive processes.
The theory in question [22] encodes binary trees and a couple of ad hoc function-
alities. We show in the technical report [25] that, provided we discard the positivity re-
quirement, the proof is possible with symmetric encryption and pairs only. This shows
that the problem remains theoretically hard even with a minimal theory.
4.4 Complexity results: unbounded case
Equivalence is undecidable in general since the calculus is Turing-complete even for
simple theories. For example, Hüttel [43] shows that Minsky’s two counter machines
can be simulated within the spi-calculus (and hence the applied pi-calculus with sym-
metric encryption only). It is not difficult to adapt the proof to a simulation using only
a free symbol, i.e., a function symbol h of positive arity and an empty rewrite system.
These two encodings can be performed within the finite-control fragment, typically not
Turing-complete in the pure pi-calculus (i.e. without this free function symbol) [35].
Ping pong protocols. While equivalence is undecidable for ping-pong protocols [27,44]
some decidability results exist under additional assumptions. For example [44] studies a
problem that can be described in our model essentially as BISIM for ping-pong protocols
with 2 participants or less (i.e. n ≤ 2 in the definition). This is proved decidable under
some model-specific assumptions which we do not detail here. We also mention a result
for patterned ping-pong protocols (cf. Section 4.2) without a limit on the number of
participants [27]. Given a constructor-destructor theory, a ping-pong protocol P is said
to be deterministic when each Pi (using the same notations as in the definition) can be
written under the form
Pi = ci(ui). new k1 · · · new kri .ci〈vi〉
where u1, . . . , un is a family of patterns verifying:
(1) binding uniqueness: for all i, ui does not contain two different variables;
(2) pattern determinism: for all i 6= j, if ui and uj are unifiable then ci 6= cj .
There is an additional, minor restriction on the structure of ui and vi that is omitted
here, and we refer to [27] for details.
Theorem 8 ([27]). For a theory limited to randomised symmetric and asymmetric en-
cryption and digital signature, TRACEEQ is decidable in primitive recursive time for
deterministic ping-pong protocols.
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Decidability is obtained by a reduction of the problem to the language equivalence
of deterministic pushdown automata, which is decidable in primitive recursive time. A
complexity lower bound for this problem is open (beyond the PTIME-hardness inherited
from static equivalence, recall Theorem 3).
Simple processes. We now study a decidability result for patterned simple processes
[26]. In this work the theory is limited to symmetric encryption and pairs, and the pro-
cesses must be type compliant and acyclic. Formalising the last two assumptions is quite
technical and beyond the scope of this survey. We refer to the technical report [25] for
more intuition and details. Compared to our other models, there is also a restriction
to atomic keys, i.e. for all encryptions senc(u, v) in the process, v is either a constant,
name or variable. This restriction is also enforced to attacker’s recipes in the semantics
by strenghtening the msg predicate.
Theorem 9 ([26]). For a theory limited to pairs and symmetric encryption, TRACEEQ
is coNEXP for patterned, simple, type-compliant, acyclic processes with atomic keys.
The proof shows that equivalence of such (unbounded) processes is violated iff it
is violated for a exponential number of sessions, and then uses a coNP decidability
result in the bounded fragment [21]. However complexity was not the focus of [26] and
the authors only claimed a triple exponential complexity for their procedure. Besides no
lower bounds were investigated, but we proved that the problem was coNEXP-complete.
Theorem 10. For a theory limited to pairs and symmetric encryption, TRACEEQ is
coNEXP-hard for patterned, simple, type-compliant, acyclic processes with atomic keys.
The reduction shares some similarities with the proof of coNEXP-hardness for trace
equivalence of bounded processes (Theorem 7), compensating the more deterministic
structure of simple processes by the use of replication.
Proof (Sketch). We proceed by reduction from SUCCINT 3SAT. This is a common
NEXP-complete problem that, intuitively, is the equivalent of 3SAT for formulas of
exponential size represented succinctly by boolean circuits. Formally a formula ϕ
with 2m clauses and 2n variables x0, . . . , x2n−1 is encoded by a boolean circuit Γ :




i ∨ `2i ∨ `3i and
0 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2, we let xk be the variable of the literal `j+1i and b its
negation bit; then Γ (̄i j̄) = b k̄ where ī, j̄, k̄ are the respective binary representations
of i, j, k. SUCCINT 3SAT is the problem of deciding, given a circuit Γ , whether the
formula ϕ it encodes is satisfiable.
Let then ϕ be a formula with 2m clauses and 2n variables x0, . . . , x2n−1 and Γ
a boolean circuit encoding this formula. We construct two simple, type-compliant,
acyclic processes that are trace equivalent iff ϕ is unsatisfiable. Using pairs 〈u, v〉 we
encode binary trees: a leaf is a non-pair value and, if u and v encode binary trees,
〈u, v〉 encodes the tree whose root has u and v as children. Given a term t, we build a
process P (t) behaving as follows:
(1) P (t) first waits for an input x from the attacker. This term x is expected to be
a binary tree of depth n with boolean leaves, modelling a valuation of ϕ (the ith
leaf of x being the valuation of xi).
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(2) The goal is to make P (t) verify that this valuation satisfies ϕ; if the verification
succeeds the process outputs t. Given two constants 0 and 1, P (0) and P (1) will
thus be trace equivalent iff ϕ is unsatisfiable.
(3) However it is not possible to hardcode within a process of polynomial size the
verification that the valuation encoded by x satisfies the 2m clauses of ϕ. Hence
we replicate a process that, given x, verifies one clause at a time. Intuitively, the
attacker will guide the verification of the 2m clauses of ϕ, and whenever the ith
clause has been successfully verified, the process reveals the binary representa-
tion of i (encrypted using a key unknown to the attacker).
(4) In particular, the attacker gets the encryption of all integers 0, . . . , 2m − 1 only
if she has successfully verified that the initial input x indeed encodes a valuation
satisfying all clauses of ϕ. It then suffices to design a process that outputs t if
the attacker is able to provide all such ciphertexts. This can be encoded by a
replicated process that, upon receiving the encryption of two integers that differ
only by their least significant bit, reveals the encryption of these integers with the
least significant bit truncated. The verification ends when the encryption of the
empty binary representation is revealed. ut
5 Variations of the model
In this section we discuss a few variants of the model such as other notions of equiva-
lence or different semantics of the process calculus.
Diff equivalence. The most well-known variant of equivalence properties in security
protocols is diff-equivalence, different variants of which are proved by the state-of-the-
art PROVERIF and TAMARIN. Intuitively, diff-equivalence can be seen as an analogue
of trace equivalence where two equivalent traces are also required to follow the exact
same execution flow. Consider for example the processes
P = c〈u〉 | c〈v〉 and Q = c〈u′〉 | c〈v′〉 .
Given the trace of P outputting u first and then v, a proof of trace equivalence could
match it with either of the two traces of Q. However diff-equivalence only considers
the trace of Q outputting u′ first and then v′.
Theorem 11 ([16]). If two processes are diff-equivalent then they are also labelled
bisimilar (and therefore trace equivalent).
The converse does not hold in general, which may lead to so-called false attacks
(non-diff-equivalent processes that are, for example, trace equivalent). Regarding de-
cidability and complexity, we call the following problem DIFFEQ:
INPUT: A theory, two processes.
QUESTION: Are the two processes diff equivalent?
Although undecidable in general, it is known to be decidable in the bounded, pos-
itive fragment [12]. More precisely it is shown that for all fixed subterm convergent
theories, diff-equivalence is reducible to a coNP constraint-solving problem.
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Theorem 12 ([12]). For all fixed subterm convergent theories, DIFFEQ is coNP for pos-
itive bounded processes.
It is also known that DIFFEQ is coNP-hard for a theory containing only a free binary
symbol h [12]. A simple proof justifies that DIFFEQ is actually coNP-hard even for the
empty theory and, hence, for any fixed theory:
Theorem 13. In the pure pi-calculus, DIFFEQ is coNP-complete for positive bounded
processes.
Proof. By reduction from SAT we consider a formula ϕ =
∧m
i=1 Ci in CNF and
x = x1, . . . , xn its variables. For each clause Ci, let ki be a name and define
CheckSat i(x) = [xi1 = bi1 ]c〈ki〉 | · · · | [xip = bip ]c〈ki〉
where xi1 , . . . , xip are the variables of Ci and bi1 , . . . , bip their respective negation
bit. That is, at least one output of ki is reachable in CheckSat i(x) if x is a valuation
of ϕ that satisfies Ci. In particular if we define
CheckSat = c(x1). . . . c(xn).(CheckSat1(x) | · · · | CheckSatm(x))
Final(t) = c(y1).[y1 = k1] . . . c(ym).[ym = km] c〈t〉
then for two distinct constants ok, ko, we have the processes CheckSat | Final(ok)
and CheckSat | Final(ko) diff-equivalent iff ϕ is unsatisfiable.
As far as we know the complexity of diff-equivalence has only been studied for fixed
theories. However the coNP-completeness [12] can be adapted to parametric theories;
inspecting the proof we observe that (1) in the complexity bounds, the dependencies
in the theory are polynomial and (2) the proof uses the fact that static equivalence is
PTIME for fixed theories (Theorem 1) but the arguments still hold if we only assume
static equivalence to be coNP.
Theorem 14. DIFFEQ is coNP-complete for subterm convergent theories and positive
bounded processes.
Equivalence by session. We also briefly mention another equivalence, between diff-
equivalence and trace equivalence (but incomparable with labelled bisimilarity) [24].
Known as equivalence by session, it was originally presented as a sound proof technique
for trace equivalence in the bounded fragment, that was inducing less false attacks than
diff-equivalence. We call this problem SESSEQ:
INPUT: A theory, two processes.
QUESTION: Are the two processes equivalent by session?
Surprisingly, despite practical improvements by order of magnitudes of the verifi-
cation time compared to trace equivalence [24], this performance gap is not reflected
in the theoretical, worst-case complexity. The same reduction as trace equivalence can
indeed be used to prove equivalence by session coNEXP-hard. More details about the
complexity of this problem can be found in the technical report [25].
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Theorem 15. SESSEQ is coNEXP-complete for constructor-destructor subterm conver-
gent theories and positive bounded (resp. bounded) processes.
The case of determinacy. We now mention the fragment of determinate processes, a
generalisation of simple processes. In this fragment of the calculus, most of the stud-
ied equivalences coincide and their complexity also drops exponentially. This class has
been investigated significantly [9,17,21,24] although several variants coexist in the liter-
ature, as discussed in [8]. For example the results of [9,24] hold for action-determinate
processes, meaning that the processes never reach an intermediary state where two in-
puts (resp. outputs) on the same communication channel are executable in parallel;
whereas a more permissive definition is used in [21]. There also exists a notion that
is stricter than all of these, referred as strong determinacy [8]. A process is strongly
determinate when (1) it does not contain private channels, (2) it is bounded, (3) all its
syntactic subprocesses are strongly determinate, (4) in case the process is of the form
P | Q there exist no channels c such that both P andQ contain an input (resp. an output)
on c. For example this process is action-determinate but not strongly-determinate:
if a = b then c(x) else 0 | if a = b then 0 else c(x) .
Note in particular that bounded simple processes are strongly determinate.
Theorem 16 ([21,24]). Two labelled bisimilar (resp. equivalent by session) processes
are trace equivalent. The converse is true for action-determinate processes.
In [21] it is shown that, for bounded, simple, positive processes, the equivalence
problem could be reduced to the same coNP constraint-solving problem mentioned in
the paragraph on diff-equivalence. Their arguments can be generalised from simple
to strongly-determinate processes in a straightforward manner; however it is not clear
whether this would also be true for action-determinate processes or processes with else
branches. In particular we obtain for this fragment:
Theorem 17 ([21]). TRACEEQ, BISIM and SESSEQ are coNP-complete for subterm con-
vergent theories and bounded, strongly determinate, positive processes. The coNP com-
pleteness also holds for all fixed subterm convergent theories.
Variations of the communication model. Although all symbolic models rely on the same
fundamental ideas, several variations exist in the semantics of communication, as noted
in [8]. The differences lie in the modelling of silent communications between parallel
processes. In the original semantics [1], called classical in [8], communications on a
same public channel between parallel processes can either be an internal, synchronous,
and silent action, or be intercepted by the attacker. This is also the semantics used
in the popular PROVERIF tool [16]. On the contrary, the so-called private semantics
only allows private, unintercepted communications on channels that are unknown to the
attacker, modelling an attacker that continuously eavesdrops on the network (rather than
an attacker that has the capability of eavesdropping any communication). The private
semantics is actually used in tools such as TAMARIN [50] and AKISS [17] and also in
the presentation of equivalence by session [24].
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Table 1. Summary of the results. Colored cells indicate configurations with open problems. All
results for diff-equivalence also coincide with the results for trace equivalence, labelled bisimi-
larity, and equivalence by session for strongly-determinate processes.
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While both semantics are equivalent when it comes to reachability properties, they
surprisingly happen to be incomparable for equivalence properties [8]. All the complex-
ity results of this paper are with respect to the private semantics. Although we did not
expand on studying all the variations of complexity induced by using different seman-
tics, most of the analyses presented in this survey are robust to these changes. Indeed, all
complexity results for the bounded fragment hold for both semantics. In the unbounded
case, only the private semantics has been considered in the underlying models [26,27].
6 Summary of the results
Table 1 summarises the results of and highlights open questions (including a few results
only detailed in the technical report [25] for space reasons). Cells for which the com-
plexity results are not tight are colored in grey. For instance, for subterm-convergent
constructor-destructor theories and bounded processes, DIFFEQ is known coNEXP and
coNP-hard, but the precise complexity remains unknown. We also include in this table
some complexity results with the theory seen as a constant of the problem (denoted
as “fixed” in the theory columns). The corresponding cells contain bounds applying
to all theories of the class; e.g. for BISIM of bounded processes, with fixed subterm-
convergent constructor-destructor theories, the problem is decidable in coNEXP and
PSPACE-hard; despite the gap between the two bounds, they are optimal since there
exist theories for which the problem is either coNEXP-hard or PSPACE. Therefore this
cell is not highlighted in grey. In our opinion the most interesting open questions are:
Can upper bounds on constructor-destructor subterm convergent theories be lifted
to more general subterm convergent theories?
Without the positivity assumption, can we tighten the complexity for diff equiva-
lence, and strongly determinate processes?
This last question might allow to better understand why strongly determinate processes
benefit from optimisations that improve verification performance that much. Finally, as
witnessed by the contrast between the high complexity of equivalence by session and
its practical efficiency, worst-case complexity may not always be an adequate measure.
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